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By:  Christine Lazaro 
On June 5, 2019, the SEC adopted the Regulation Best Interest Rule Package.  The package 
consists of Regulation Best Interest:  The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct;1 Form CRS 
Relationship Summary and Amendments to Form ADV;2 Commission Interpretation Regarding 
Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers;3 and Commission Interpretation Regarding the 
Solely Incidental Prong of the Broker-Dealer Exclusion from the Definition of Investment 
Adviser.4  This article will summarize each of the releases. 
I. Regulation Best Interest 
a. General Obligation 
Regulation Best Interest requires that brokerage firms and their brokers must act in the best 
interests of their retail customers when making recommendations of securities or investment 
strategies.5  The brokerage firm and the broker may not place their own interests ahead of the 
customers’ interests.6   
For purposes of this standard, the term “recommendation” has the same meaning it currently has 
under FINRA rules.7  It is a fact-based determination.  The SEC recognizes that factors to 
consider are “whether the communication ‘reasonably could be viewed as a ‘call to action’’ and 
‘reasonably would influence an investor to trade a particular security or group of securities.’”8   
The SEC provides some guidance as to what would not be considered a recommendation, 
including communications such as general financial and investment information; descriptive 
information about an employer-sponsored retirement plan; certain asset allocation models; and 
interactive investment materials.9   
Recommendations include advice about the type of securities account to open, as well as advice 
to roll over or transfer assets from one account to another.10  Additionally, a broker may be 
                                              
1 Regulation Best Interest:  The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318 (July 12, 2019) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
2 Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,492 (July 12, 2019) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 240, 249, 275, and 279). 
3 Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 84 Fe. Reg. 33,669 (July 12, 
2019). 
4 Commission Interpretation Regarding the Solely Incidental Prong of the Broker-Dealer Exclusion From the 
Definition of Investment Adviser, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,681 (July 12, 2019). 
5 17 C.F.R. §240.15l-1(a)(1) (2019). 
6 Id. 
7 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,337. 
8 Id. at 33,335. 
9 Id. at 33,337 – 33,338. 
10 Id. at 33,338. 
deemed to have made an implicit hold recommendation, triggering the obligations of the Rule, if 
the broker has agreed to perform periodic account monitoring.11  
Brokerage firms and brokers owe this obligation to “retail customers.”  The SEC defines retail 
customer to focus on natural persons and their legal representatives, seeking advice for personal, 
family, or household purposes.12   
b. Component Obligations 
Regulation Best Interest is comprised of four components:  (i) the Disclosure Obligation; (ii) the 
Care Obligation; (iii) the Conflict of Interest Obligation; and (iv) the Compliance Obligation.13  
i.  Disclosure Obligation 
The Disclosure Obligation requires that a broker or brokerage firm make full and fair disclosure 
in writing of “material facts relating to the scope and terms of the relationship” with the 
customer; and “material facts relating to such conflicts of interest that are associated with the 
recommendation.”14  “Materiality” has the same meaning the Supreme Court articulated in Basic 
v. Levinson.15,16   
Material facts related to the scope of the relationship explicitly include the following types of 
information:  (i) the capacity in which the broker is acting (as a broker-dealer or investment 
adviser); (ii) fees and costs associated with the transactions and the accounts more generally; and 
(iii) the type and scope of the services the brokerage firm will offer, including any limitations on 
those services.17   
Regardless of whether the firm and individual is dually-registered, both still have to disclose the 
capacity in which they are acting.  If the firm or individual is not dually-registered but uses the 
term “advisor” or “adviser”, they will likely be in violation of this obligation because their 
disclosure about capacity will not be accurate.18   
With respect to fees and costs, the SEC expects that brokerage firms will build on the disclosure 
of fees and costs which are set forth in Form CRS (to be discussed in further detail below).19  
The obligation does not require that the brokerage firm provide “individualized” costs and fees, 
                                              
11 Id. at 33,340. 
12 Id. at 33,343. 
13 17 C.F.R. §240.15l-1(a)(2) (2019). 
14 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,347. 
15 Id.  
16 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
17 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,349. 
18 Id. at 33,352. 
19 Id. at 33,354. 
but rather may provide standardized or hypothetical amounts or percentage ranges.20  Brokerage 
firms may also satisfy this part of their disclosure obligations by providing mandated disclosure 
documents, such as prospectuses, and trade confirmations.21   
With respect to the type of services the brokerage firm offers, the firm must disclose whether it 
monitors transactions and strategies.22  As part of this disclosure, the brokerage firm must be 
specific as to the frequency and duration of the services offered.23  The brokerage firm may rely 
on information disclosed in the Form CRS (as will be discussed below), but will likely need to 
expand on that information to meet this disclosure obligation.24  However, the brokerage firm 
may rely on other documents, including account agreements, to make these disclosures.25  As 
part of this disclosure, brokerage firms must also disclosure whether they have any account 
minimums.26 
The brokerage firm must also disclose any limitations on its offerings.27  Limitations include for 
example, if the brokerage firm only offers proprietary products.28  Additionally, if the brokerage 
firm is dually registered but the broker is not, the broker must disclose that he cannot offer 
advisory services.29   
The conflicts of interest disclosure obligation should summarize how the brokerage firm and the 
brokers are compensated for their recommendations as well as the conflicts that the 
compensation arrangements create.30  These conflicts need not be disclosed on a 
recommendation by recommendation basis.31   
The disclosure obligation does require that the disclosures be made in writing, however, the SEC 
recognizes that it may be necessary to supplement, clarify, or update written disclosures with oral 
disclosures.32  However, if the brokerage firm does supplement the written disclosures, the 
brokerage firm must keep a record of the fact that an oral disclosure was provided.33   
                                              
20 Id. at 33,355. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 33,356. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 33,357. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 33,358. 
27 Id. at 33,357. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 33,363. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 33,368. 
33 Id. 
ii.  Care Obligation 
The Care Obligation in many ways mirrors the FINRA Suitability Rule.  It requires that the 
broker, when making a recommendation, exercise “reasonable diligence, care, and skill to:”  
(A) Understand the potential risks, rewards, and costs associated with the 
recommendation, and have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation 
could be in the best interest of at least some retail customers;  
(B) Have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is in the best interest of a 
particular retail customer based on that retail customer’s investment profile and the 
potential risks, rewards, and costs associated with the recommendation and does not 
place the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or such natural person ahead 
of the interest of the retail customer; and 
(C) Have a reasonable basis to believe that a series of recommended transactions, even if 
in the retail customer’s best interest when viewed in isolation, is not excessive and is 
in the retail customer’s best interest when taken together in light of the retail 
customer’s investment profile and does not place the financial or other interest of the 
broker, dealer, or such natural person making the series of recommendations ahead of 
the interest of the retail customer.34  
The first prong is similar to the “reasonable basis” obligation under the FINRA Suitability 
Rule.35  As a threshold issue, the broker must understand the security or investment strategy 
recommended before being capable of determining whether the recommendation is in the best 
interest of a particular customer.36  The SEC sets forth factors the broker or brokerage firm 
should consider when investigating the security or investment strategy:  “the security’s or 
investment strategy’s investment objectives, characteristics (including any special or unusual 
features), liquidity, volatility, and likely performance in a variety of market and economic 
conditions; the expected return of the security or investment strategy; as well as any financial 
incentives to recommend the security or investment strategy.”37 
The SEC has included “costs” as a factor in evaluating securities or strategies because it 
recognizes that cost will always be a relevant factor.38  “Costs” includes both costs associated 
with purchasing a security, as well as future costs associated with exchanging or selling a 
security.39  However, the SEC cautions that cost is not a dispositive factor.  The Rule does not 
require that a broker recommend the lowest cost option.40   
                                              
34 17 C.F.R. §240.15l-1(a)(2)(ii) (2019). 
35 See FINRA Rule 2111.05(a). 
36 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,375 – 33,376. 
37 Id. at 33,376. 
38 Id. at 33,373. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
The second prong incorporates the “customer specific” prong of the FINRA Suitability Rule,41 
but enhances it by replacing “suitable” with a best interest standard.42  In sum, the broker must 
determine that a recommendation is in the customer’s best interest based on that customer’s 
investment profile.  The customer’s investment profile includes “age, other investments, 
financial situation and needs, tax status, investment objectives, investment experience, 
investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance,” and any other information that may be 
disclosed.43  This is the same information that firms must currently consider as part of the 
investor’s profile under the FINRA Suitability Rule.44  If a customer does not provide the 
information, the SEC cautions that a firm may not have sufficient information to make a best 
interest determination.45 
In evaluating whether a recommendation is in the customer’s best interest, the broker should 
consider reasonably available alternatives offered by the broker’s firm.46  The broker need not 
recommend the “best” of all possible alternatives.47  The Rule also does not require that the 
broker be familiar with every product available by the brokerage firm.48  The scope of the 
reasonably available alternatives that are considered with respect to any particular 
recommendation will depend on several factors, including, the broker’s customer base; the 
products available to the broker to recommend; and specific limitations on the available 
products, including that products may only be available in certain geographical locations or to 
particular types of accounts.49 
For dually registered brokers, the options with respect to account type must be considered as 
reasonably available alternatives.50  If the broker may only offer brokerage accounts, the broker 
must consider the customer’s objectives before recommending a brokerage account.51  For 
example, if the customer is requesting that the broker have unlimited discretion, a brokerage 
account would not be appropriate.52  
When recommending a roll over, the broker must consider a number of factors, including, “fees 
and expenses; level of service available; available investment options; ability to take penalty-free 
withdrawals; application of required minimum distributions; protection from creditors and legal 
judgments; holdings of employer stock; and any special features of the existing account.”53  A 
                                              
41 See FINRA Rule 2111.05(b). 
42 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,377. 
43 17 C.F.R. §240.15l-1(b)(3) (2019). 
44 See FINRA Rule 2111(a). 
45 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,379. 
46 Id. at 33,381. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 33,382. 
50 Id. at 33,383. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
broker may not just consider whether the roll over may offer additional options beyond the 
customer’s current plan.  
The final component is similar to the “quantitative suitability” requirement,54 except that the 
“control” element has been eliminated.55  This component is intended to prevent trading that is so 
excessive that a positive return is virtually impossible.56  
iii.  Conflict of Interest Obligation 
The Conflict of Interest Obligation requires a firm to adopt policies and procedures designed to 
identify and, at a minimum, disclose all conflicts associated with a recommendation.57  The 
obligation further requires that a brokerage firm mitigate or eliminate certain types of conflicts.58   
With respect to the content of the policies and procedures, the SEC contemplates that brokerage 
firms will have flexibility to design policies and procedures that are risk-based rather than 
requiring a detailed review of each recommendation.59  The SEC suggests certain components a 
brokerage firm should consider when adopting policies and procedures including:  
[P]olicies and procedures outlining how the firm identifies conflicts, identifying such 
conflicts and specifying how the broker-dealer intends to address each conflict; robust 
compliance and monitoring systems; processes to escalate identified instances of 
noncompliance for remediation; procedures that designate responsibility to business line 
personnel for supervision of functions and persons, including determination of 
compensation; processes for escalating conflicts of interest; processes for periodic review 
and testing of the adequacy and effectiveness of policies and procedures; and training on 
policies and procedures.60 
Under this obligation, the brokerage firm has a duty to, at a minimum, disclose all conflicts of 
interest.61  Disclosure must be full and fair; if it is not possible to fully and fairly disclose a 
conflict, it must be mitigated such that full and fair disclosure is possible.62   
Brokerage firms have a duty to identify and mitigate conflicts of interest that create an incentive 
for the broker to place the interests of the broker or the firm ahead of the interests of the 
customer.63  The SEC has chosen to primarily limit the duty to mitigate to broker-level conflicts, 
                                              
54 See FINRA Rule 2111.05(c). 
55 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,384. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 33,385. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 33,386. 
60 Id. at note 688. 
61 Id. at 33,388. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 33,390. 
allowing the brokerage firms to generally deal with firm-level conflicts through disclosure.64  
The requirement to identify and mitigate broker-level conflicts applies only to incentives 
provided to the broker, either by the firm or third parties that are within the control of or 
associated with the firm.65  Accordingly, the requirement does not create an obligation with 
respect to private securities transactions.66  The SEC does provide examples of conflicts that 
must be mitigated:  (i) compensation from the brokerage firm or third parties, including fees and 
other charges associated with the service or recommendation provided; (ii) employment 
incentives, including those tied to asset accumulation, special awards, variable compensation, 
and compensation tied to performance reviews; and (iii) commissions, sales charges, or other 
fees whether paid by the customer, the brokerage firm, or a third party.67 
Mitigation measures should be based on the nature and significance of the incentive, as well as 
other factors related to the brokerage firm’s business model, such as the size of the firm, the 
types of customers, and the complexity of the security product or strategy.68  
The SEC provides a list of best practices for brokerage firms developing policies and procedures 
for mitigation methods: 
 Avoiding compensation thresholds that disproportionately increase compensation through 
incremental increases in sales; 
 Minimizing compensation incentives for employees to favor one type of account over 
another; or to favor one type of product over another, proprietary or preferred provider 
products, or comparable products sold on a principal basis, for example, by establishing 
differential compensation based on neutral factors; 
 Eliminating compensation incentives within comparable product lines by, for example, 
capping the credit that an associated person may receive across mutual funds or other 
comparable products across providers; 
 Implementing supervisory procedures to monitor recommendations that are:  near 
compensation thresholds; near thresholds for firm recognition; involve higher 
compensating products, proprietary products or transactions in a principal capacity; or, 
involve the roll over or transfer of assets from one type of account to another (such as 
recommendations to roll over or transfer assets in an ERISA account to an IRA) or from 
one product class to another; 
 Adjusting compensation for brokers who fail to adequately manage conflicts of interest; 
and 
                                              
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 33,391. 
66 Id. at note 744. 
67 Id. at 33,391. 
68 Id.  
 Limiting the types of retail customer to whom a product, transaction or strategy may be 
recommended.69 
If a brokerage firm materially limits its securities offerings or investment strategies, the 
brokerage firm must prevent such limitations from causing the firm to put its interests ahead of 
the customers’.70  The SEC considers that recommending only proprietary products, products 
with revenue sharing arrangements, or a specific asset class would be material limitations.71  The 
SEC recommends that brokerage firms offering limited menus consider establishing a “product 
review process” which includes evaluating the use of preferred lists; restrictions on the 
customers to whom a product may be sold; requiring brokers selling certain products to have 
minimum knowledge requirements; as well as period product reviews to further evaluate 
conflicts.72 
Certain practices are completely prohibited pursuant to this obligation.  Brokerage firms must 
eliminate “sales contests, sales quotas, bonuses, and non-cash compensation that are based on the 
sales of specific securities or specific types of securities within a limited time.”73  Non-cash 
compensation includes merchandise, gifts and prizes, travel expenses, meals and lodging.74  This 
obligation is not intended to eliminate all incentives, only those that create high-pressure 
situations to sell specific securities within a limited period of time.75  It likely will not capture 
contests or other incentives tied to total products sold or asset accumulation and growth.76  
Brokerage firms may also continue to hold annual conferences, so long as attendance is not 
premised on the sale of specific securities within a limited period of time.77 
iv. Compliance Obligation 
The Compliance Obligation is an overarching requirement to adopt policies and procedures that 
are reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the Rule as a whole.78  The Rule does not 
specify which policies and procedures must be adopted.  The SEC expects brokerage firms to 
design policies and procedures that “prevent violations from occurring, detect violations that 
have occurred, and to correct promptly any violations that have occurred.”79  Brokerage firms are 
                                              
69 Id. at 33,392. 
70 Id. at 33,393. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 33,394. 
73 17 C.F.R. §240.15l-1(a)(2)(iii)(D) (2019). 
74 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,396. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 33,397. 
79 Id. 
expected to tailor their policies and procedures to account for the “scope, size, and risks 
associated with the operations of the firm and the type of business in which the firm engages.”80 
II. Form CRS Relationship Summary 
In addition to adopting a new standard of conduct for brokers and brokerage firms, the SEC also 
adopted a new disclosure obligation for both brokerage firms and investment advisers.81  The 
SEC will require that both brokerage firms and investment advisers create and deliver a 
relationship summary to prospective and existing customers.  This section will describe the 
relationship summary and the firms’ delivery obligations.   
a. Presentation and Format 
The SEC allows firms to use a mix of prescribed wording along with firm-authored wording in 
drafting the relationship summary.82  For example, firms will be able to describe their services, 
investment offerings, fee, and conflicts of interest.83  However, firms will be required to use 
prescribed headings, conversation starters, and statement describing their standard of conduct 
when providing investment advice.84   
The SEC requires that headings be in the form of prescribed questions, in a set order.85  The 
relationship summary may not exceed four pages for a dual registrant that includes both its 
brokerage and advisory services in a single summary.86  Otherwise, the relationship summary 
may not exceed two pages for brokerage firms and investment advisers that are describing one of 
their services.87   
The SEC is encouraging the use of graphics to facilitate comprehension, including using charts, 
graphs, tables, text colors, and graphical cues such as dual-column charts.88  Additionally, firms 
may include QR codes and hyperlinks to facilitate layered disclosure.89  However, a firm may 
not satisfy its disclosure obligations of the relationship summary through the use of 
“incorporation by reference.”90  
                                              
80 Id. 
81 84 Fed. Reg. 33,492. 
82 Id. at 33,502. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 33,504. 
86 Id. at 33,505. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 33,507. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 33,508. 
b. Content  
i.  Introduction 
Firms are required to open the relationship summary with a standardized introduction that 
includes (i) the name of the firm and whether it is a brokerage firm or investment adviser; (ii) a 
statement that brokerage and advisory services and fees differ; and (iii) a statement that research 
tools are available at Investor.gov/CRS.91 
ii.  Relationships and Services 
Following the introduction, firms must summarize the relationships and services they offer under 
the heading, “What investment services and advice can you provide me?”92  Additionally, firms 
must include any material limitations on the services they offer to investors.93  In the description 
of services, firms must address (i) monitoring; (ii) investment authority; (iii) limited investment 
offerings; and (iv) account minimums and other requirements.94   
With respect to monitoring, firms must explain whether they monitor an investor’s accounts, 
including the frequency of the monitoring and any limitations on the monitoring.95  If an 
investment adviser accepts discretionary authority, the firm must describe how the authority will 
be exercised.96  For example, if the firm requires investor input before exercising discretion in 
certain circumstance, the firm must explain that.97  Both investment advisers and brokerage firms 
that offer non-discretionary services must explain that the investor is the ultimate decision 
maker.98  If a firm has a limited menu of offerings, such as only proprietary products or a specific 
asset class, the firm must explain those limitations.99  Firms must also disclose whether there are 
minimums to open an account or place a trade, or if there is a tiered fee schedule.100   
In the relationship and services section of the form, firms must also provide additional 
information which further explains the firms’ services.101  This section should provide the 
information about services that would be available in an investment adviser’s Form ADV, Part 
2A brochure, or that a brokerage firm otherwise has to provide under Reg. BI.102  This section of 
                                              
91 Id. at 33,513. 
92 Id. at 33,515. 
93 Id. at 33,516. 
94 Id. at 33,517. 
95 Id. at 33,518. 
96 Id. at 33,519. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 33,520. 
100 Id. at 33,521. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
the disclosure may be layered, providing hyperlinks or other ways of directing the investor to the 
source of the information.103 
The relationship and services section will also contain three conversation starters.104  The first 
conversation starter will be tailored to the nature of the firm’s business.  For firms that are not 
dual registrants, the firm will include, “Given my financial situation, should I choose a brokerage 
service?  Why or why not?” or “Given my financial situation, should I choose an investment 
advisory service?  Why or why not?”105  Dual registrants will include, “Given my financial 
situation, should I choose an investment advisory service?  Should I choose a brokerage service?  
Should I choose both types of services?  Why or why not?”106 
Additionally, firms will also include the following two questions:  (i) “How will you choose 
investments to recommend to me?;” and (ii) “What is your relevant experience, including your 
licenses, education and other qualifications?  What do these qualifications mean?”107 
iii.  Summary of Fees, Costs, Conflicts, and Standards of Conduct 
Firms will begin the discussion of fees, costs, conflicts, and standards of conduct with the 
heading, “What fees will I pay?”108  In this section, the firm must summarize the principal costs 
and fees that investors will incur, including how frequently they are assessed and what conflicts 
of interest the fees may create.109  Additionally, firms must describe other fees and costs 
associated with their services or investments, whether paid directly or indirectly.110  The SEC 
provides some examples of the other fees and costs that may need to be disclosed, including:  
custodial fees; account maintenance fees; fees related to mutual funds and variable annuities; 
distribution fees; platform fees; and shareholder servicing fees.111   
Finally, firms are required to include the following statement:  “You will pay fees and costs 
whether you make or lose money on your investments.  Fees and costs will reduce any amount of 
money you make on your investment over time.  Please make sure you understand what fees and 
costs you are paying.”112   
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104 Id. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 33,524. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 33,527. 
Firms must also include a conversation starter about fees:  “Help me understand how these fees 
and costs might affect my investments.  If I give you $10,000 to invest, how much will go to fees 
and costs, and how much will be invested for me?”113   
Following the fees and costs discussion, firms must discuss the standard of conduct that applies, 
using prescribed language.114  Additionally, this section must include a summary of certain firm-
level conflicts.115   
The disclosure that firms have to make will vary based on whether it is [a broker making a 
recommendation], [an investment adviser], or [a dual registrant]: 
[When we provide you with a recommendation,] [When we act as your investment 
adviser,] [When we provide you with a recommendation as your broker-dealer or act as 
your investment adviser,] we have to act in your best interest and not put our interest 
ahead of yours.  At the same time, the way we make money creates some conflicts with 
your interests.  You should understand and ask us about these conflicts because they can 
affect the [recommendations] [investment advice] [recommendations and investment 
advice] we provide you.  Here are some examples to help you understand what this 
means.116 
Following the prescribed wording, the firms must summarize the following ways the firm makes 
money which involve conflicts:  (i) from proprietary products; (ii) from third-party payments; 
(iii) by revenue sharing; and (iv) by principal trading.117  If the firm does not have any of these 
conflicts, it must describe one material conflict of interest that will affect retail investors.118   
In this section, firms must include the following conversation starter:  “How might your conflicts 
of interest affect me, and how will you address them?”119  Finally, firms must include the 
heading, “How do your financial professionals make money?” and include a description of how 
their financial professionals are compensated, including both cash and non-cash compensation, 
as well as the conflicts that the payments create.120 
iv. Disciplinary History 
The relationship summary will also include a section about whether the firm or its financial 
professionals have any disciplinary history, as well as where an investor may find additional 
                                              
113 Id. at 33,528. 
114 Id. at 33,530. 
115 Id. at 33,529. 
116 Id. at 33,532 – 33,533, notes 507 – 509.  
117 Id. at 33,533. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 33,535. 
120 Id. at 33,536. 
information.121  This section will begin with the following question:  “Do  you or your financial 
professionals have legal or disciplinary history?”  Firms will have to answer yes if they have any 
of a number of disclosable events as set forth in the instructions.122  For example, firms will have 
to answer yes if a broker has any items disclosed pursuant to question 14 A though M on the 
Form U4.123 
This section must also include the following conversation starter:  “As a financial professional, 
do you have any disciplinary history?  For what type of conduct?”124 
v. Additional Information 
The final section of the relationship summary will state where the investor can find additional 
information.125  This section will also include the following conversation starters:  “Who is my 
primary contact person?  Is he or she a representative of an investment adviser or a broker-
dealer?  Who can I talk to if I have concerns about how this person is treating me?”126  Finally, 
this section must include a phone number where investors can request up-to-date information as 
well as a copy of the relationship summary.127 
c. Filing, Delivery, and Updating Requirements 
Firms must file the relationship summary with the SEC; and the SEC will make the forms 
publicly available through the website, Investor.gov.128  Additionally, firms must make the forms 
available on their own websites.129   
Firms may deliver the relationship summary electronically, so long as the firm complies with the 
SEC’s rules regarding electronic delivery.130  Essentially, the firm must make the investor aware 
that the form is available electronically; the access to the information must be comparable to that 
which would have been provided in paper form; and the firm must maintain evidence of 
delivery.131   
Brokerage firms must deliver the relationship summary before or at the earliest of:  (i) a 
recommendation as to account type, a securities transaction, or an investment strategy; (ii) 
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126 Id. at 33,540. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 33,545. 
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130 Id. at 33,546. 
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placing an order; or (iii) opening a brokerage account.132  Investment advisers must deliver the 
relationship summary before or at the time of entering into an investment advisory contract with 
an investor.133   
After the initial delivery of the form, firms must re-deliver the relationship summary whenever:  
(i) an account is opened that is different than the investor’s existing account(s); (ii) there is a 
recommendation to roll over assets; or (iii) there is a recommendation for a new service or 
product that would not be held in an existing account.134  This last item contemplates 
recommendations for investments such as direct-sold mutual funds or insurance products.135 
Finally, firms must update the relationship summary within 30 days whenever the relationship 
summary becomes materially inaccurate.136  At that time, the revised relationship summary must 
be filed with the SEC and posted to the firm’s website.137  Firms will have 60 days to deliver the 
revised relationship summary to existing clients.138  When delivering the revised relationship 
summary, firms must highlight any changes by either marking the revised text or including a 
summary of the changes.139 
III. Investment Adviser Interpretation 
As part of the Regulation Best Interest Rule package, the SEC issued an interpretation of the 
investment adviser standard of conduct.140  The SEC recognized that the investment adviser’s 
fiduciary duty follows the contours of the relationship with the client.141  Further, an investment 
adviser can shape that relationship by agreement, so long as there is full and fair disclosure, and 
informed consent by the client.142  The specific duties an investment adviser owes a client will 
depend on the services the adviser has agreed to perform for the client.143  However, an 
investment adviser cannot have a client waive the fiduciary duty.144   
a. Duty of Care 
An investment adviser’s fiduciary duty includes a duty of care.  This duty includes:  (i) the duty 
to provide advice that is in the best interest of the client; (ii) the duty to seek best execution of a 
client’s transactions where the adviser has the duty to select the broker-dealer that will execute 
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the client’s trades; and (iii) the duty to provide advice and monitoring over the course of the 
relationship.145 
The duty to provide advice that is in the best interest of the client is a duty to provide advice that 
is suitable for the client.146  To be able to satisfy this duty, the investment adviser must make a 
reasonable inquiry into the client’s financial situation, financial sophistication, investment 
experience, and financial goals, among other things.147  Further, the investment adviser must 
determine that the client can and is willing to tolerate the risks of any recommended investment, 
and that the potential benefits of the investment recommendation justify the risks.148   
Next, the investment adviser must conduct a reasonable investigation into the investment being 
recommended.149  As part of the investigation, the investment adviser must consider a number of 
factors relating to the investment, including the cost associated with the investment advice; as 
well as the investment product’s or strategy’s investment objectives, characteristics, liquidity, 
risks and potential benefits, volatility, likely performance in a variety of market and economic 
conditions, time horizon, and cost of exit.150  This duty applies to advice about investment 
strategy, engaging a sub-adviser, and account type.151  Accordingly, advice to open a particular 
type of account (brokerage or investment advisory) as well as advice about rolling over assets 
would trigger this duty.152   
In seeking best execution, an investment adviser must try to execute trades such that the costs or 
proceeds from each transaction are the most favorable for the client.153   
The duty to monitor means the investment adviser must monitor a client’s account at a frequency 
that is in the best interest of the client.154  However, if the investment adviser has been engaged 
for a limited duration, the investment adviser is unlikely to have a duty to monitor.155 
b. Duty of Loyalty 
In simple terms, an investment adviser has a duty of loyalty, which prohibits the investment 
adviser from subordinating its clients’ interests to its own.156  As part of this duty, the investment 
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adviser must make full and fair disclosure of any material facts relating to the advisory 
relationship.157   
Additionally, the investment adviser must eliminate or at least expose through full and fair 
disclosure all conflict of interest which might incline an adviser to render advice that is not 
disinterested.158  For disclosure to be full and fair, the disclosure must be specific enough so that 
the client can understand the material fact or the conflict of interest and be able to make an 
informed decision as to whether to provide consent.159   
As part of its disclosure, an investment adviser may not state that the adviser “may” have a 
conflict if the conflict actually exists; however, “may” could be appropriate if the conflict does 
not currently exist but might reasonably present itself in the future.160  In other words, disclosure 
will not be full and fair if the adviser states that a conflict “may” exist if the conflict already does 
exist. 
Investment advisers do not have to determine whether the client actually understood the 
disclosure made.161  The investment adviser merely has to put the client into the position to be 
able to understand the disclosure.162  However, if the investment adviser actually knows, or 
reasonably should know, that the client does not understand the disclosure, the adviser cannot 
accept the client’s consent.163 
If the conflict is of a nature and to an extent that it would be difficult to be able to fully explain 
the conflict in a way that it could be understood by a client, the investment adviser must 
eliminate or mitigate the conflict.164   
IV. Solely Incidental Prong of the Broker-Dealer Exclusion from the Definition of 
Investment Adviser 
In the last item of the Regulation Best Interest Rule package, the SEC provided an interpretation 
of the “solely incidental” prong of the broker-dealer exclusion from the definition of “investment 
adviser.”165  In this interpretation, the SEC clarified that if a broker exercises unlimited 
discretion, such conduct would not be “solely incidental” to the business of the broker-dealer, 
and accordingly, the brokerage firm would meet the definition of “investment adviser.”166  
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However, discretion that is limited in scope would not necessarily turn a brokerage firm into an 
investment adviser.167 
With respect to monitoring a customer’s account, if the monitoring is at specific intervals for the 
purpose of determining whether to provide a buy, sell, or hold recommendation, such conduct 
would be considered “solely incidental” to the broker-dealer’s primary business of effecting 
securities transactions.168  It would not turn the brokerage relationship into an advisory 
relationship. 
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